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The Perfect Storm 
 
During the last quarter of a century, public higher education institutions have found 
themselves buffeted by a perfect storm (a term I owe to Pat Callan). This storm has led to 
discussions about the privatization of those institutions, which has implications for their 
ability to improve, or at least maintain, their quality and their accessibility to students 
from all socioeconomic backgrounds.  A weakening of our public higher education 
system along either the quality or accessibility dimension would have serious 
implications for our nation’s future. 
What are the factors led to this perfect storm? Following the Reagan revolution in the 
1980s, which reduced the value of the state income tax deduction on federal income tax 
returns, taxpayers clamored for state income tax cuts. But since then, increased state 
funding needs for Medicaid, elementary and secondary education, and the criminal 
justice system have put increasing pressure on state tax revenues.  The consequence has 
been structural deficits in many state budgets.  There simply have not been sufficient 
revenues available to fund public higher education generously, and dramatic reductions in 
the share of state budgets devoted to higher education have taken place. 
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 Since these pressure on state coffers were mounting just when enrollments in public 
higher education institutions were rapidly increasing (from under 8 million in 1974 to 
over 12 million in 2004), it is perhaps remarkable that average state appropriations per 
full-time equivalent student at public higher education institutions have increased, on 
average, at an annual rate that has exceeded the rate of increase in consumer prices by 
about 0.6 percent a year (or remained almost flat if inflation is calculated not by the 
Consumer Price Index but according to the more realistic Higher Education Price Index).  
Given that state support for public higher education is one of the few real discretionary 
categories in state budgets and higher education is one of the few state agencies that 
charges for its services, policymakers seem to have concluded that flat funding is all that 
public higher education can expect from the state.  Real increases will have to be 
provided by tuition.  
Traditionally public higher education has been viewed as a social good that yields 
benefits to the nation as a whole. But as earnings differences between highly educated 
and less educated individuals have widened, and the private economic return higher 
education provides its students has grown, policymakers have concluded that those 
students and their families should pay a greater share of the costs of public higher 
education. (See David Longanecker’s article in this issue for a more extensive discussion 
of policymakers’ attitudes.) 
During the same period, however, the private colleges and universities were raising 
their tuitions at a rate of over three percent above inflation. In an effort to remain 
competitive, public higher education institutions raised their tuition annually at roughly 
equivalent rates.  But because public tuitions started at a much lower level, the actual 
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dollar increases the publics netted from these increases have been much lower. Moreover, 
privates with large endowments benefited greatly from the run up in stock market prices 
that took place during the 1990s.  
As a result, expenditures per student at the publics have fallen relative to those at the 
privates.  During the 20 years ending in 1995-96, expenditures per student (adjusted for 
inflation) rose by 52 percent at private four-year institutions and by 40 percent at private 
four-year institutions. Average expenditures at public four-year institutions that were 
about 78 percent of the level at their private counterparts in 1975-76 fell to 72 percent by 
1995-96. Due to changes in accounting rules, expenditure-per-student data have not been 
published for private colleges and universities since 1995-1996, but the percentage is 
undoubtedly much lower today. 
 As a result, faculty salaries at public universities have fallen relative to those at 
private universities.  Data from the American Association of University Professors’ 
annual survey indicate that between 1978-79 and 2003-2004, the average salary of full 
professors in public doctoral institutions fell from 91percent to 78 percent of the average 
salary of full professors in the privates. This has made it difficult for the publics to attract 
and retain top faculty. During that same period, student/faculty ratios at public 
universities rose relative to those at private universities.  Using IPEDs data, Thomas 
Kane and Peter Orzag calculate that between 1971 and 1997, the number of full-time 
equivalent students per faculty member fell at private research universities from 17.3 to 
15.7 while it rose slightly at public research universities from 21.1 to 21.7. 
 Resource constraints have led public colleges and universities, more than their 
private counterparts, to substitute part-time and full-time non-tenure-track faculty for 
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tenured and tenure-track faculty.  For example, during the decade of the 90s alone, the 
percentage of undergraduate credit hours taught by tenured and tenure-track faculty fell 
by over 22 percentage points at the four State University of New York university centers. 
Research that I conducted with Liang Zhang of the University of Minnesota suggests that 
these types of substitution have a negative effect on undergraduate students’ graduation 
rates and first-year drop-out rates, with the largest impacts at the four-year public 
comprehensive institutions. We found that for those institutions, a ten-percentage point  
increase in part-time faculty is associated with a three-percentage point reduction in the 
five-year graduation rate, while a ten-percentage point increase in full-time faculty in 
non-tenure-track positions is associated with a reduction of 4.4 percentage points in the 
graduation rate, all things being equal. 
As public tuition levels have increased and a greater share of public higher education 
costs have been shifted to students and their families, states and the federal government 
have responded to political pressure from the middle class by shifting financial aid away 
from need-based aid. At the state level, a greater share of funding is now in the form of 
grant aid to students rather than appropriations to public institutions to support their 
operations. And that aid is increasingly based on merit, which privileges educationally 
advantaged students.  
By 2003, 13 mostly Southern states had introduced broad-based merit-aid programs 
modeled on Georgia’s Hope Scholarship and, like it, designed to encourage high school 
graduates to attend in-state academic institutions. Susan Dynarski calculates that in many 
of these states, the 30 percent or more of high school graduates who qualify for these 
awards are disproportionately white and middle- or upper-income. Hence the growth of 
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these programs can be understood primarily as a response to large voting blocs concerned 
about rising college tuitions, not as an effort to increase access for underrepresented 
groups. 
At the federal level, the major growth in financial aid has been in loans and tax 
credits for college attendance, not increases in the level of Pell grant awards.  And 
massive federal deficits, both now and projected for the future -- caused by recent 
reductions in federal tax rates, increases in military expenditures (at least in the short 
run,) and the growing need to worry about future Medicare and Social Security trust fund 
deficits -- make it unlikely that the federal government will be a future source of revenue 
to shore up our nation’s public higher education system through substantial increases in 
need-based grant aid to students. 
 So increasingly, providing grant aid to maintain access to public higher education is 
becoming the responsibility of the public higher education institutions themselves.   
 
Can Privatization Work?  
While privatization policies have arisen at least partially from the budget problems 
that states face, as well as from policymakers’ willingness to shift the costs of higher 
education from taxpayers to students, they also arise from the view that forcing the 
publics to behave more like the privates and compete for resources will lead to increased 
efficiencies and the elimination of waste.  Meanwhile, as state support becomes an 
increasingly smaller proportion of their budgets, many public institutions want to be freed 
from governmental constraints that lead to inefficiencies in their operations and to have 
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the freedom to make economic decisions that will improve their ability to compete with 
the privates.  
The most important of these is the freedom to raise tuition to market levels.  In the 
past, public universities typically raised their resident undergraduate tuition substantially 
only when state appropriations were cut during a recession, in order to partially offset the 
effects of the state cuts. But when they did, state legislatures and governors took the heat, 
thus generating political pressure to limit future tuition increases or even to roll back 
previous increases, as happened in Virginia and California in recent years. 
 Whether making formal agreements with the state to trade some level of state support 
for tuition control gives the publics more freedom is an open question. For example, 
Miami University of Ohio moved to a high-tuition policy in the fall of 2004, charging 
resident and nonresident students the same tuition but promising each resident 
undergraduate student a grant at least equal to the state appropriation per student that it 
received. However, Miami’s proposed increase in undergraduate tuition of nine percent 
for fall 2005 was vetoed when the legislature and the governor capped resident tuition 
increases at six percent or $500, whichever was less. In Miami’s case, it was $500, which 
translated into a 5.5 percent resident tuition increase. 
Privatization policies vary widely and depend upon the specific circumstances of the 
state. For example, constitutional limitations on the growth of state expenditures, from 
which grants to students were exempt, convinced administrators of the University of 
Colorado system that they were better served by giving up much of their state 
appropriation in return for accepting a system in which students would receive vouchers 
that could be used to partially offset tuition payments at state institutions. Inasmuch as 
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the initial level of these vouchers was less than the cut in state appropriations per student 
that the university faced, they university had to negotiate a substantial increase in tuition 
as well. (See the James Jacobs article in this issue for more about the Colorado 
experiment.) 
Or to take another example, the Virginia General Assembly recently adopted 
legislation that grants public institutions additional authority over financial and 
administrative operations (including the freedom to raise tuition, within limits), but only 
after they make certain commitments to the state and only with appropriate 
accountability. Three levels of autonomy are available to institutions, depending upon 
their financial strength and management structure. (See Gov. Mark Warner and Peter 
Blake’s article in this issue for a discussion of the Virginia plan.) 
In judging the likely success of privatization efforts, it is important to understand how 
undergraduate and graduate education expenditures are financed.  At private colleges and 
universities, the three largest source of revenue are net tuition (tuition minus grant aid), 
endowment income, and annual giving. Public institutions have these three sources plus 
state appropriations.  
Although the extra source of revenue would seem to advantage the publics, it does 
not.  If state appropriations (or the vouchers that substitute for them) fail to grow or are 
cut back, a greater share of public institutions’ educational funding must come from net 
tuition growth and increases in endowment income and annual giving. But while some 
flagship public institutions have substantial endowments and annual-giving levels, most 
do not.  As John Wiley – the chancellor of the University of Wisconsin-Madison -- has 
shown, most of them are unlikely to be able to generate the endowment and annual-
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giving levels that would be necessary to compensate for reductions in their state support. 
Hence while aggressively seeking increased endowments and annual giving may help, 
public higher education institution trying to compensate for declining state support will 
have to devote most of their efforts to increasing their net tuition revenues. 
The key work here is net. Increasing tuition by a given percentage does not guarantee 
that the total revenues generated by the tuition increase will increase by the same 
percentage, since a portion of those revenues goes to student aid, otherwise known as 
tuition discounts.  Preliminary results from the 2004 annual NACUBO Tuition 
Discounting study suggest that freshman tuition discount rates average 38.6 percent at 
private colleges and universities in the United States, ranging from 41.1 percent at low-
tuition smaller colleges to 30.5 percent at the larger private universities. Moreover, save 
for a few highly selective private colleges and universities, these tuition discounts are not 
based solely on need but often on merit.  Institutions use aid to boost their position on the 
prestige hierarchy by crafting a class with the desirable characteristics of high test scores 
and low need. 
Flagship public universities have far more applicants than they have positions in their 
first-year student bodies. So large tuition increases are unlikely to leave them with 
unfilled seats. What they do have to worry about is maintaining the selectivity of their 
undergraduate student bodies, since large tuition increases may make private competitors 
seem more attractive to many of their top applicants who do not have financial need. 
Hence a share of the extra tuition revenues that the public institutions receive from 
substantially increasing tuition would most certainly be directed towards merit-based 
scholarships. Given all the other uses that they have for the extra tuition revenues as well 
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(for example, building back full-time faculty size and increasing faculty and staff 
compensation), they may or may not have generated the necessary extra institutional 
funds to compensate for decreased appropriations once they hit their market limits on the 
price of tuition. 
Nevertheless, the flagships are the public institutions that will prosper the most from 
moving to a high tuition/low state appropriations model, because the demand for their 
seats is likely to be much less sensitive to price than for those at the public 
comprehensives, which already admit a high percentage of their applicants. Attempts to 
raise tuition substantially there may well result in lower enrollments and less net tuition 
coming in, as some potential students instead enroll in private four-year or public two-
year colleges or simply fail to enroll in college at all. 
It is absolutely essential that the public flagships remain accessible to students from 
lower- and lower-middle income families. But data on the share of Pell Grant recipients 
among the undergraduate student bodies at our nation’s major public universities 
suggests that a number of these institutions already enroll relatively few students from 
these groups (some flagships, such as the University of California campuses, are notable 
exceptions). For example, Donald Heller has estimated that in 2001-2002 Pell Grant 
recipients were 19 percent of the undergraduate student bodies at our nation’s most 
selective public universities, whereas they were about 27 percent of the undergraduate 
student bodies nationally at four-year public institutions.  
 With privatization, we run the risk of public higher education’s coming even more 
stratified, with upper- and upper-middle-income students studying at relatively well-
funded flagship campuses and lower- and lower-middle income students studying at less 
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well-funded public comprehensive institutions and two-year colleges. The flagships will 
have not only more room to raise tuition but a much greater ability to increase their other 
sources of revenue (such as endowments, annual giving, indirect costs on research grants, 
and revenues from commercialization of research findings).  Large funding differentials 
already exist between these institutions, and they will get worse.  For example in 2001-
2002, instructional expenditures per full-time student averaged $9,673 at public flagship 
(doctoral-extensive) campuses, $4,903 at public comprehensive institutions, and $3,979 
at public two-year colleges. And having access to the flagships makes a long-term 
difference to students:  Research has shown that those who attend better-funded 
institutions have higher earnings after graduation. 
  Such increasing stratification is not socially desirable.  Any “compact” to allow the 
public flagships to increase their tuition levels substantially must include a commitment 
to ensure that they are accessible to students from throughout the spectrum of family 
incomes. Examples of public flagships that already have undertaken such commitments 
are the University of North Carolina Chapel Hill, with its “Carolina Covenant,” and the 
University of Virginia, with its “Access UVA” program.  Both programs guarantee that 
students from families with incomes less than twice the federal poverty level can attend 
the institution without incurring any debt. Both programs include comprehensive efforts 
by the universities to recruit more students from lower-income families and, in the case 
of Virginia, a promise to report to the state each year on the socioeconomic distribution 




Public Higher Education is More than Undergraduate Education 
Advocates of privatization of public higher education assume that cutbacks in state 
support can be made up by increases in tuition paid by students who will reap the 
economic return from their investments in education. This is at least partially true for 
undergraduate education and for graduate programs that train students for professional 
careers.  But high tuition levels coupled with the need to take out loans may well 
discourage students from majoring in lower-paying fields that are important to society, 
such as education, social work and nursing. If tuitions do increase sharply at public 
higher education institutions, it will be incumbent upon states to develop or expand 
scholarship or loan-forgiveness programs for graduates of their public institutions who 
remain in the state after graduation and work in fields deemed to be important to the 
state. 
 Most doctoral students at major American universities are supported by their 
institutions on fellowships, research assistantships, and teaching assistantships, all of 
which typically provide for tuition remission. Funds for these forms of support at public 
universities come largely from federal research grants and state appropriations. It will be 
difficult to make up for cutbacks in state support for doctoral education by raising 
graduate tuition levels.  Faculty with external research grants that cover tuition for 
graduate students will suddenly see the real value of their grants reduced, and tuition 
remission for teaching assistants reduces institutional net revenue.   
So absent raising tuition for undergraduate still further to subsidize the cost of 
doctoral education, a politically and morally unpalatable move, reduced state support for 
public higher education will lead to less well-funded doctoral students. This will reduce 
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the attractiveness to top American undergraduates of doctoral study at the public 
universities and adversely affect the quality of the graduate students who are serving as 
teaching assistants at those institutions, which in turn will adversely affect the quality of 
undergraduate education. 
Doctoral students are an important input into research at the public universities.  
Fewer and lower-quality students will reduce the quantity and quality of the research that 
is produced at there. Studies suggest that the level of research conducted at a university 
affects the level of innovation and economic growth in the area surrounding it. Most state 
support for research that public universities receive takes the form of lower teaching 
loads for faculty to allow them more time for research. If less state support for research is 
translated into higher teaching loads for faculty (and fewer faculty), this will not only 
reduce their research productivity but further increase the difficulty that the public 
flagships have in attracting and retaining high-quality faculty.  
Public institutions, especially the land grants, have an obligation to serve the 
population of the entire state, not just the students attending the institutions. Through 
agricultural, consumer, and industrial extension services, these institutions have been 
major transmitters of knowledge to American farmers, consumers, workers, and industry. 
Cutbacks in state appropriations for the extension and land-grant activities of the 
institutions have forced these operations to become more entrepreneurial.  They can use 
the “profits” from groups that can pay (e.g. large corporations) to subsidize the provision 
of services to underserved populations, services that were previously financed by the 
state. However, forced to generate their own revenues, it is natural for extension services 
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to spend a greater share of their time on commercial activities and less on serving the 
public at large.  
More generally, public higher education benefits many more citizens of the state than 
those attending the institutions or those directly receiving services from the extension 
activities of the institutions. Research indicates there is a social return to higher education 
that includes increased income for non college graduates, increased state tax revenues, 
increased intergenerational mobility, and lower welfare costs. If a high-tuition policy for 
public higher education reduces the fraction of the population going on to and completing 
college, we will all be worse off. 
 
Looking to the Future 
Privatization may help the most competitive flagship public universities obtain the 
resources they need to compete with their private-sector counterparts and regain their 
quality, but special efforts will be required to make sure that they continue to enroll 
students from lower and middle-income families. Privatization is much less likely to be a 
viable strategy for our nation’s public comprehensives and two-year colleges, and that is 
where our primary concern about reductions in state support should lie. 
Economists and higher education finance specialists are not known for their accuracy 
in making long-run forecasts about higher education.  During the 1970s many predicted 
that public colleges and universities would prosper relative to the private counterparts in 
the years ahead, and as I have shown, these predictions were not correct.  However, these 
scholars do understand the role that incentives play.  
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Thomas Kane and King Alexander, among others, have been struck by how 
asymmetrical the incentives in federal public policy are with respect to state Medicaid 
and state higher education expenditures. Through matching formulae, a state that spends 
more on Medicaid is rewarded with more federal matching funds, whereas a state that 
reduces its Medicaid expenditures sees its federal funding diminish. In contrast, when a 
state spends less on its public higher education institutions and the institutions respond by 
increasing tuition, the level of Pell Grant funds received by the residents of the state goes 
up. So in tough times, a state gains revenues by protecting its Medicaid expenditures 
rather than appropriations to its public colleges and universities. 
 Regardless of one’s political persuasion and one’s perspectives on the desirability 
of privatization, most people would probably conclude that at least the incentives in 
federal public policy for states to spend more on higher education should be symmetrical 
to the incentives for them to spend more on Medicaid. Developing federal policies that 
reward states for spending more, rather than less, on their public higher education 
institutions and for spending more on need-based financial aid would go a long way to 
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